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SECURING THE PRECIPITOUS
HEIGHTS: U.S. LAWFARE AS
A MEANS TO CONFRONT
CHINA AT SEA, IN SPACE,
AND CYBERSPACE
Garret S. Bowman*
With regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your
adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there
wait for him to come up. If the enemy has occupied them before you,
do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.1

* Judge Advocate, United States Air Force, (LL.M., Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law, University of Nebraska School of Law (2021); J.D. Case Western Reserve
School of Law, Cum Laude (2014); B.A., Political Theory and Constitutional Democracy,
Michigan State University (2008)) advises on operations at the 16th Air Force, San Antonio Texas. Major Bowman has previously served as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at
Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea. He is a member of the Ohio Bar. Major Bowman would like
to thank his wife Katherine, and his professors, Michael Schaefer and Jack Beard for their
support and assistance in developing this article.
** The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of
Defense.
*** As U.S. foreign policy shifts its strategic focus towards confronting “near peer
adversaries,” the issue of China looms particularly large. For the past few decades, The
U.S. and Chinese Communist Party have been moving towards an ideological confrontation on the future of the rules-based international order. The military side of this greatpower competition has been focused on the East China Sea, with increasingly significant
issues emerging in the domains of space and cyberspace. This article argues that lawfare,
the strategic application of legal regimes and institutions, must be a fundamental part of
U.S. strategy. The Chinese Communist Party has embraced a lawfare strategy but the
United States must more aggressively exploit opportunities to exploit its institutional advantages. This Article concludes that arms control in outer space presents a unique opportunity to strengthen the U.S. lawfare advantage in other domains like cyberspace and
at sea by bolstering the rules-based order. This outcome is fundamental to sustaining
relative peace and prosperity over the next century.
1 SUN TZU & SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, THE ART OF WAR 125 (Oxford University Press
1964).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Barring unforeseen events or domestic instability, the Chinese
Communist Party’s economic and military strength will continue to rise,
along with its ambitions for East Asia. The U.S. is facing an incremental
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decline in its regional power relative to the People’s Republic of China
(“PRC”). Economically, 1.4 billion Chinese citizens will soon collectively
out produce 328 million Americans if current trends continue.2 This
economic power will translate to diplomatic, political, and military influence, particularly impacting those countries that share borders with
China and neighbor the East China Sea. From a mid-term perspective,
the U.S. hopes to deter a PRC invasion of Taiwan and maintain shipping
lanes in the East China Sea.3 From a long-term perspective, the U.S.
hopes to maintain its influence and prosperity vis-a-vis PRC as ensured
by the rules-based international order (“RBIO”).4
U.S. influence in the region is tied to the institutionalized cooperation and historical military alliances with Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.5 America’s future influence involves strengthening and expanding its partnerships with increasingly powerful democracies like India.6
2 See Evelyn Cheng & Yen Nee Lee, New chart shows China could overtake the U.S.
as the world’s largest economy earlier than expected, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2021, 10:04 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/01/new-chart-shows-china-gdp-could-overtakeus-sooner-as-covid-took-its-toll.html (citing economists’ forecast that China’s GPD
will overtake U.S. GDP by 2028).
3 See Dan Lamothe, In Taiwan war game, few good options for U.S. to deter China,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/10/26/us-taiwan-china/ (explaining the need to build relations with
Taiwan to deter Chinese action).
4 “RBIO” in this article refers to international relations organized around international cooperation through multilateral institutions, open markets, security cooperation, promotion of liberal democracy, and leadership by the United States and its
allies. See U.S. Relations With Taiwan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ (outlining U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability); see also Rezaul H. Laskar, Modi
speaks to US President Joe Biden, says committed to rules-based order, HINDUSTAN TIMES
(Feb. 09, 2021, 8:36 AM), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modispeaks-to-us-prez-biden-says-committed-to-rules-based-international-order101612807900279.html (quoting Prime Minister Modi’s tweet “President @JoeBiden
and I are committed to a rules-based international order. We look forward to consolidating our strategic partnership to further peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond” and the White House readout of the call detailing a focus on “defend[ing] democratic institutions and norms around the world.”); see also Douglas H.
Paal, America’s Future in a Dynamic Asia, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE 14–18
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/31/america-s-future-indynamic-asia-pub-78222 (discussing competing U.S. strategies for China including
containment, a new balance of power, integration into the existing international system, or the joint creation of a new international system).
5 See Paal, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that by virtue of its existing network of
alliances and friendships, the United States enjoys an advantage over China in the Asia
Pacific).
6 See U.S. Security Cooperation With India, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-india/ (outlining increasing
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The 2020s are a pivotal decade. In the currently contested sea domain
and the rapidly expanding areas of cyberspace and outer space, the U.S.
has a unique opportunity to win a decisive legal and political victory
over the PRC. In each of these domains, the PRC has exposed itself as illsuited to adopting the mantle of responsible superpower and world
leader.7 The international reputation of China is at an all-time low while
America's national security policy is re-focusing its efforts on thwarting
the PRC and Russia’s “revisionist” aims.8 In this new security landscape,
America must be able to reclaim its title as leader of a robust international order by aggressively defending its values and bolstering its alliances.9 It can accomplish this in part by adopting an aggressive lawfare
strategy in space, cyberspace, and in the South China Sea. Space, in particular, demands incorporation into a larger U.S. lawfare strategy.
By addressing the increasingly scrutinized issue of space weaponization through a targeted destructive anti-satellite (“ASAT”) test-ban
treaty, the U.S. can win a lawfare victory against the PRC that will impact
other domains.10 Recent developments in rules governing space
security commitments with India); see also U.S. - India Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Oct. 26, 2021, 12:57 PM), https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-india-relations (providing background of the increasing ties between the U.S. and India, the
world’s largest democracy); see also Paal, supra note 4, at 23 (“India would welcome
a more proactive policy and greater investment from the United States in the region.
But at the same time, until New Delhi sees concrete evidence of a U.S. commitment,
India will primarily pursue a bilateral approach to China, taking advantage of cooperation with Washington when benefits outweigh the risks to relations with Beijing.”).
7 See SHIRLEY KAN , CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22652, CHINA’S ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON TEST
1 (2007) (discussing China’s widely criticized Anti-Satellite test in 2007 and its aggressive posturing on territorial claims in the East China Sea have not been well received by the world community).
8 Laura Silver et al., Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many
Countries,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Oct.
6,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highsin-many-countries (“Views of China have grown more negative in recent years across
many advanced economies, and unfavorable opinion has soared over the past year.”);
see also National Security Strategy of the United States of America, WHITE HOUSE 1, 25
(Dec.
2017),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (“China and Russia want to shape a
world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic
model, and reorder the region in its favor.”).
9 See, e.g., id. (“The United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors
from a position of strength, foremost by ensuring our military power is second to
none and fully integrated with our allies and all of our instruments of power.”).
10 See generally TIMOTHY A. WALTON, CHINA’S THREE WARFARES 4 (Delex Systems,
Inc. 2012) (“Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high
ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be employed to hamstring an adversary’s
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security include a U.K.-drafted December 2020 U.N. resolution aimed at
developing rules governing activities in space.11 Whatever the likelihood of this developing into a proposal for a binding treaty governing
space activities, the U.S. should not discount the advantages of addressing limited arms control while pursuing a broader lawfare strategy regarding China.
Lawfare, the idea that strategic advantage can be obtained through
use of legal regimes and institutions,12 must be a key element in U.S.
strategy to confront PRC activities that threaten the RBIO that has benefited the international community for decades.13 The PRC does not and
cannot offer a reasonable or responsible alternative to U.S. leadership in
the maintenance and formation of international law. Although the Chinese government seeks to present its model of authoritarian sovereignty as an alternative to U.S. leadership, it has stumbled in claiming the
mantle of responsible world leader.14 Its failure to join the Budapest
Convention which seeks to regulate cyberspace,15 and its 2016 loss in a
operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal warfare is also intended
to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s
military actions.”).
11 G.A. Res. 75/36, ¶ 2 (Dec. 7, 2020); see Sandra Erwin, U.S. to support international effort to set rules of behavior in space, SPACENEWS (Feb. 24, 2021), https://spacenews.com/u-s-to-support-international-effort-to-set-rules-of-behavior-in-space/;
see also Nicholas Smith Adamopoulos; U.S. Advocates for Binding Rules on Behavior in
Space, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Apr. 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/202104/news/us-advocates-binding-rules-behavior-space (detailing specific language to
be included in a resolution regarding responsible behavior in space).
12 Craig Martin, What Are the Limits on Lawfare?, OPINIOJURIS (May 5, 2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/05/05/what-are-the-limits-on-lawfare/.
13 See ELBRIDGE COLBY, FROM SANCTUARY TO BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR A U.S.
DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY FOR SPACE 24 (2016) (outlining the increasing threat
to space assets and suggesting that the U.S. may seek to raise the international political costs to potential adversaries of striking at U.S. space assets).
14 China has publicly proposed a “Community of Common Destiny,” expressing
Beijing’s long-term vision for making the international environment compatible with
the Chinese government model and emergence as a global leader. These aspirations
of leadership can be contrasted with international criticism aimed at the 2007 ASAT
test, aggressive posturing in the East China Sea, and reluctance to adopt meaningful
rules or cooperation in cyberspace. See Liza Tobin, Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global
Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and its Allies, 2 TEXAS NAT’L SEC. REV.
155, 155 (2018).
15 P.J. Blount, Cyberspace and the Problem of New Spaces, E-INT’L RELATIONS (Nov.
25, 2019), https://www.e-ir.info/2019/11/25/cyberspace-and-the-problem-ofnew-spaces/#_ftnref12; see also Parties/Observers to the Budapest Convention and
Observer Organisations to the T-CY, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/parties-observers?wpisrc=nl_cybersecurity202 (last visited Nov. 19, 2021)
(indicating that China is not a party to the Convention).
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U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) decision and failure
to comply with that ruling,16 offer the U.S. a unique opportunity to expose the Chinese government’s hypocrisy and structural incompatibility
with world leadership. More importantly, the U.S. should not squander
its opportunity to reshape the narrative regarding the continued
weaponization of space.
Since its widely condemned 2007 ASAT test, the PRC has sought to
rebrand itself as interested in the collaborative and cooperative use of
outer space.17 The PRC’s criticism of U.S. space weapon development
and the PRC’s repeated sponsorship of the Treaty on the Prevention of
the Placement of Weapons in Space (“PPWT”) seeks to control the narrative on the future of space development.18 The U.S. should not ignore
these efforts. It has the opportunity to seize on Chinese missteps in cyberspace and in the East China Sea to rebut the PRC’s posturing in outer
space.19 If the U.S. aggressively seeks a narrow hard-law arms-control
treaty in space it will strengthen a legal regime in line with U.S. interests
while increasing political pressure on the PRC in outer space and other
domains.20 The political and legal battlefield is the critical area for U.S.
strategic focus.21 A sustained political and moral advantage is necessary
to prevent a gradual drift in world leadership.22 In particular, the U.S.
16 Julian Ku, The U.S. Should Hold Its Fire Over China’s Boycott of UNCLOS Arbitration, LAWFARE (Nov. 26, 2015, 7:27 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-shouldhold-its-fire-over-chinas-boycott-unclos-arbitration.
17 See generally ALEXANDER BOWE, CHINA’S POSITION ON A CODE OF CONDUCT IN SPACE,
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N, 2 (2017) (demonstrating China’s current views on
outer space conduct); see also, Park Si-soo China silent, South Korea ‘concerned’ over
debris created by Russia’s anti-satellite missile test, SPACENEWS, (Nov. 17, 2021),
https://spacenews.com/china-silent-south-korea-concerned-over-debris-createdby-russias-anti-satellite-missile-test/ (“Asked to comment on [Russia’s 2021 ASAT
test] during a Nov. 16 press conference, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao
Lijian said, “We noted relevant reports and that Russia has yet to respond. I think it is
too early to make any comment.””).
18 See BOWE, supra note 17, at 2–3, 5.
19 Id. at 4–5.
20 See Victoria Samson & Brian Weeden, Enhancing Space Security: Time for Legally Binding Measures, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Dec. 2020), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-12/features/enhancing-space-security-time-legally-bindingmeasures (stating that the U.S. should pursue legally binding treaties to enhance national security interests. For example, the U.S. supporting a ban on debris-creating
ASAT weapons tests “could send a powerful political signal”).
21 Id.
22 ANONYMOUS, THE LONGER TELEGRAM: TOWARD A NEW AMERICAN CHINA STRATEGY 10
(Frederick Kempe et al. eds., 2021) [hereinafter THE LONGER TELEGRAM] (“The United
States’ China strategy must be anchored in both national values and national interests. This is what has long distinguished the nation from China in the eyes of the
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should acknowledge the value of expanding the space legal regime,
whether or not its efforts become international law.23
This article seeks to reframe the debate in space over arms control
vs. deterrence by positing that lawfare is the essential consideration for
the U.S. adoption of targeted arms control. Arms control can be justified
not only by its opportunity to regulate the arms race, but also by its ability to rally allies, confront bad actors like China, and reframe the debate
about the future productive use of outer space.24 Although benefits to
the U.S. are obtainable whether or not China or Russia ultimately agree
to any form of arms control, the content of any proposal must be plausible,25 feasible,26 and rendered in good faith.27 In contrast to Chinese and
Russian proposals on space weapons, the U.S. has little to gain by advocating for unrealistic or cynical applications of arms control.28 U.S. willingness and ability to shape the narrative of a potential legal regime is
an asset in itself and can be obtained by forcefully promoting a narrowly
tailored arms control advocated for by certain scholars.29 Policymakers
should recognize lawfare’s benefits as part of a larger strategic push to
manage China’s rise while protecting the U.S. led rules-based order. This
means exploiting the PRC’s legal and political hypocrisy in space, cyber
world. The defense of universal liberal values and the liberal international order, as
well as the maintenance of US global power, must be the twin pillars of America’s
global call to arms.”).
23 Samson & Weeden, supra note 20.
24 See, e.g., David A. Koplow, The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race
in Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT'L L. J. 331, 332–34, 345, 347, 379, 387 (2018) [hereinafter
Koplow, Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space] (highlighting possible arms control
initiatives to address the arms race in outer space including leveraging allies’ space
capabilities, holding bad actors accountable for adverse practices and noting the
growing economic dependence on space); THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7 (2010) (“The United States will pursue bilateral and
multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. The United States will consider proposals and concepts for arms-control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.”).
25 David A. Koplow, Apes on a Treadmill in Space, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Apr. 2021),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-04/features/apes-treadmill-space#endnote04.
26 John Lauder et al., How to Avoid a Space Arms Race, RAND BLOG (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/10/how-to-avoid-a-space-arms-race.html.
27 Samson & Weeden, supra note 20.
28 BOWE, supra note 17, at 4.
29 See Jack M. Beard, Soft Law's Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 335, 417 (2017) (arguing that an
important first step in preventing space debris is an international agreement banning
the testing of debris generating ASATs).
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space, and the East China Sea.30 Deterrence alone risks expediting an
arms race already underway and creates instability in the absence of any
agreed upon parameters.31
Part II provides background of the debate between mutually exclusive deterrence alone and comprehensive arms control in space and outlines how both are incompatible with U.S. national security. Part III outlines China’s lawfare strategy, and Part IV argues that the U.S. should
focus on arms control in space as part of a broader strategy in cyberspace and at sea to counter Chinese lawfare.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE ARMS CONTROL DEBATE IN OUTER SPACE

In the realm of outer space weaponry, the strategic focus has been
on achieving supremacy through technological and military deterrence.32 But a growing chorus of observers argue that some form of
arms control is necessary to restrain and refocus the arms race in
space.33 The issue of space debris and its threat to all space-faring nations is a cause for concern and an opportunity for compromise.34
Across U.S. administrations, the focus on a military buildup to achieve
deterrence has prevailed.35 Despite the U.S. head start on space technology, and the relative lack of conflict in space, an unconstrained arms race
between the U.S., Russia, and the PRC is nearly universally seen as a net

30 See generally Joan Johnson-Freese, U.S.-China Relations: The Hypocrisy of
Rules, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 22, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/u-s-china-relations-the-hypocrisy-of-rules/ (demonstrating China’s hypocrisy).
31 U.S. INST. OF PEACE, PEACEWORKS: ENHANCING U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC STABILITY IN AN
ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION 49 (Patricia M. Kim, ed., 2021).
32 David A. Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin: The Case for Arms Control in
Outer Space, 10 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 293, 309 (2019), [hereinafter Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin].
33 See, e.g., Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 347 (stating
that the last century of legal restraints on space arms control has contributed to improvements in chemical and biological weapon disciplines, while work in space itself
has stopped); see, e.g., Cort S. Thompson, Avoiding Pyrrhic Victories in Orbit: A Need
for Kinetic Anti-Satellite Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century, 85 J. AIR L. & COM.
105, 106, 129 (2020) (arguing that states should reenter reciprocal arms control
agreements because countries are facing restraints on weapons research and development due to lack of legal constraints on the field); see also Beard, supra note 29, at
419 (determining that the time for legally binding restraints has arrived).
34 See Thompson, supra note 33, at 114 (arguing that because sovereign states
use space resources for their own benefit, the Tragedy of the Commons occurs,
demonstrating a need for collective action).
35 See, e.g., id. at 114 (discussing the use of the military to protect access to
space).
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loss to humanity and the individual countries participating in it.36 An
unconstrained arms race is expensive and risky; competitors must
spend to continuously develop new weaponry while potentially destabilizing the national security balance between countries, risking conflict.37 Nations with an advantage in deterrence seek to obtain more advanced and effective weaponry while those left behind are incentivized
to take risks to prevent being overcome completely.38 The prevalence
of anti-satellite capable missiles and the risk of ever-multiplying space
debris means that even a technologically out-classed state could make a
devastating attack in space.39 In contrast to the Cold War, where the
U.S.S.R. was unable to sustain competition into the 1990s, there is no
clear indication that the U.S. can use an arms race to outspend or out
develop a rising China in the long run.40 Because of the cost, risk, and
uncertainty created by an escalating arms race in space, there has been
significant discussion on the potential for space-focused arms control.41
Of course, arms control would not stop an arms race, but rather define
the parameters of weapons buildup in a manner consistent with the interest of the parties to any proposed agreement.42
Most proposals have focused on the necessity of a hard-law treaty
to blunt the acceleration of a space arms race.43 These proposals include
narrowly tailored or limited propositions to rekindle a willingness to

36 Id. at 113–14; but see John Yoo, Rules for the Heavens: The Coming Revolution
in Space and the Laws of War, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2020) (arguing that space
weapons have benefits including: greater precision, fewer casualties and destruction,
and more effective crisis bargaining between states).
37 See generally Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32 (stating that
deterrence is expansive and expensive where each side must ensure it cannot fall behind in the perpetual contestation).
38 Id. at 296.
39 See generally id. at 297, 343 (detailing the types of anti-satellite weapons and
the growth of space debris on state military capabilities).
40 See James Dobbins et al., Russia Is a Rouge, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a
Rogue, RAND CORP. 2, 5 (Oct. 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE310.html (noting that China’s GDP is second only to the U.S. and projected to
have 2.2-fold growth in PPP by 2040).
41 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 295.
42 See ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 130–32 (Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (asserting that when treaties do address weapons systems, they are likely to be partial agreements rather than
comprehensive ones, understanding the need to channel arms races rather than do
away with them).
43 Blair Stephenson Kuplic, The Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1134–35 (2013).
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compromise between China, Russia, and the U.S.44 Those countries are
the most engaged in the productive use of outer space and most threatened by potential conflict and space debris.45 Kinetic ASAT testing is
seen as a likely area for compromise as it poses the most significant
threat of space debris, and the major players have developed alternative
means to ensure relative national security.46
Previously, there was no indication that policymakers in the U.S.
saw arms control as anything more than an unproductive measure that
would constrain the U.S. advantage in space weaponry.47 More recently,
the U.S. has indicated support for “adopting a binding set of rules to
make space safer and sustainable.”48 If momentum can be sustained,
this is a positive development for making space safer and for allowing
the U.S. to reassert its leadership in the development of international
law.49 But U.S. foreign policy, generally governed by relatively stable
consensus across different administrations, is vulnerable to shifts in
rhetoric, emphasis, and strategy as it saw during the Trump administration.50 This underscores the challenge that democracies like the U.S. face
when confronting autocratic regimes which may have a longer strategic
time frame.51 Some on the left see U.S. space militarization as inherently
destabilizing, while some political commentators on the right critique
any form of arms control as naïve utopianism at best and national security malpractice at worst.52 The political reality cannot be disregarded
44 Koplow, Avoiding an Arms race in Outer Space, supra note 24, at 363 (discussing the impact of joint participation on global security); see also Beard, supra note 29,
at 416 (asserting that solutions lie in legally binding prohibitions on specific types of
the most harmful conduct, restrictions that are also likely to benefit from more feasible methods of verification).
45 See Katharina Buchholz, The Countries with the Most Satellites in Space,
STATISTA (July 14, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/17107/countries-withthe-most-satellites-in-space/.
46 See Beard, supra note 29, at 419 (describing how China, Russia and the U.S.
have demonstrated ASAT capabilities including directed energy weapons).
47 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 295.
48 See Erwin, supra note 11 (citing U.S. Space Command Maj. Gen. DeAnna Burt).
49 See Erwin, supra note 11 (discussing how the non-binding nature of prior resolutions has hindered the effort to make space safer).
50 Chinyere Obasi, The Fault in Our Stars: Modern Threats to International Space
Law, HARV. POL. REV. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://harvardpolitics.com/modern-threatsto-international-space-law/.
51 See, e.g., KRISTA LANGELAND ET AL., TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR CHINA IN SPACE 31
(RAND Corp., eds. 2021) (highlighting the challenges that the U.S. has faced in deterring China from interfering with space-based operations).
52 Charles Krauthammer, The Irrelevance of START, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 26, 2010,
5:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/11/irrelevance-start-charles-
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by legal and strategic planners. Populist movements on both the left and
right may impact the trajectory of U.S. strategic policy in space.53 As this
article will argue, lawfare properly applied can both deter provocation
by adversaries while strengthening the liberal international order. This
allows policy makers to win near-term lawfare victories while building
multilateral institutions and agreements in the long term.54
A.

The Limits of Deterrence in Space

Deterrence is fundamentally an effort to persuade another actor to
adopt a course of action we prefer, or to refrain from taking actions we
disfavor.55 Although deterrence is a psychological phenomenon, an attempt to influence the decisions of rational competitors, it primarily involves the pursuit of military technology and hardware.56 The ability to
exert the psychological pressure for effective deterrence requires (1)
sufficient military equipment and technology, (2) the ability to quickly
determine the nature and origin of a threat, and (3) the ability to demonstrate determination or political will to exercise deterrent capabilities.57
Prof. Koplow outlines two basic approaches to deterrence, (1) deterrence by threat of retaliation and (2) deterrence by denial.58 Threat
of retaliation includes symmetric, tit-for-tat retaliation, where a nation
responds to an attack in kind, and asymmetric retaliation, or cross-domain retaliation, that strikes a different location or utilizes a different
modality.59 Both symmetric and asymmetric retaliation must meet the
requirement that retaliation be proportional under international law.60
There is no requirement that a defender responds identically to the acts
of an aggressor. In the space context, a symmetric retaliation to a kinetic
satellite strike would be a responsive strike on the attacker’s satellite.61
An asymmetric retaliation may include an attack on ground-based
krauthammer/; Lauren Hauck, The Rogue One: Trump’s Space Force and the Threat of
a New Cold War, 42 U. HAW. L. REV. 119, 139 (2020).
53 See James Clay Moltz, Space and Strategy: A Conceptual versus Policy Analysis,
ASTROPOLITICS: INT’L J. OF SPACE POL. & POL’Y 113, 130–31 (2010) (explaining the use of
an overriding goal that is widely accepted).
54 FORREST E. MORGAN, DETERRENCE AND FIRST-STRIKE STABILITY IN SPACE: A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 51 (RAND Corp. 2010).
55 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 295.
56 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 307–08.
57 Id. at 310.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 312.
60 Id. at 313.
61 Id. at 312.
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satellite control systems or even attacking naval or land-based assets.62
Deterrence by denial seeks to persuade a potential attacker that
they have a limited chance of success in launching an attack or an aggressive action.63 This includes intercepting the attack, i.e. destroying an
incoming force or weapon completely or by partial attrition so that it
minimizes the impact of the attack.64 It may also include deterrence by
self-protection, through fortifying or otherwise reducing the vulnerability of a threatened military force or asset.65 While this framework is
commonly applied to nuclear deterrence or navel freedom of navigation
exercises, it faces unique challenges when applied to the rapidly evolving military activities located in and focused on outer space.
The U.S. is dependent on outer space and has reaped the benefits of
outer space more than any other nation.66 The U.S. has nearly three
times the number of satellites of Russia and China combined.67 American satellites control the way its military fights, how its economy runs,
and has transformed the lives of its citizens.68 While this is true for both
China and Russia, the U.S. is particularly reliant on satellites and space
technology.69 American adversaries understand this reliance and vulnerability and actively work to exploit and threaten this exposure.70
Adding to this dependence and vulnerability are issues with attributing the origins of a particular attack. To effectively practice deterrence
by denial, the victim of an attack would have to quickly attribute who
Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 313–14.
Id. at 314.
64 See COLBY, supra note 13, at 26 (describing how the current policy by the
United States of denying an attack by North Korea or Iran is a method that is emulated
by U.S. space policy).
65 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 316.
66 See COLBY, supra note 13, at 4 (“The United States is profoundly reliant on the
ability to use space for its security [...] [I]t has the upper hand because it can understand better what is taking place in the midst of conflict, what its own forces are doing,
and what those of an enemy are doing amidst the “fog of war.” The United States can
therefore employ force around the globe [...] more effectively.”).
67 William J. Broad, How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest Between
the U.S. and China, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/trump-biden-pentagon-space-missiles-satellite.html (“The United States leads in satellite tallies, mainly because of its space-age
legacies and its many entrepreneurs, including those now aiding the military . . . 1,425
for the United States, 382 for China and 172 for Russia.”).
68 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 297–98.
69 Id. at 299.
70 Broad, supra note 67 (“‘They saw how the U.S. projected power,’ said Todd
Harrison, a space analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. ‘And they saw that it was largely undefended.’”).
62
63
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the aggressor is. In space, this is more difficult than during terrestrial
conflict.
Senior leaders in Washington would likely require absolute proof of who
the attacking country is when our satellites are destroyed before they
would allow any counterstrikes. Since attacking ASAT systems do not have
big red stars painted on their sides and are likely constructed of Western
parts, quick attribution is quite problematic. It may essentially cause selfdeterrence and paralysis of national leadership decisions. Currently, if a
satellite stops working, determining the cause takes weeks and months
and is ultimately only a guess since these space systems cannot generally
be directly imaged. US adversaries do not seem to practice self-deterrence.
As a result, the space war may well be over before the United States even
knows it began.71

Thus, U.S. satellites pose an attractive target to potential adversaries and
may create challenges in determining the author of an attack. All this is
to say that deterrence by retaliation faces unique risks and challenges
when compared with the more familiar Cold War paradigm.
Further, when considering the impact of space debris on any kinetic attack, cascading symmetric relation in space means that in striking foreign satellites, the U.S. risks making orbits unusable for the foreseeable future.72 Even disabling satellites by dazzling or cyber-attacks
creates a risk of collision and debris.73 The “Kessler syndrome” describes the idea that any debris creation will be exacerbated at a near
exponential rate.74 But if the U.S. relies on asymmetric deterrence, i.e.
striking or threatening to strike terrestrial targets, it risks unpredictable
escalation as proportionality is harder to access cross domains.75 An
isolated satellite strike could devolve into full-scale mutual retaliation
on terrestrial targets. Regardless, the problem of attribution remains.
As for deterrence by denial, satellites are vulnerable targets with
no practical way to harden from attack. Maneuvers cost fuel, and

71 Paul Szymanski, Techniques for Great Power Space War, 13 STRATEGIC STUDIES
Q. 78, 94–95 (2019).
72 Ramin Skibba, The Ripple Effects of a Space Skirmish, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/space-warfare-unregulated/614059/.
73 See id. (explaining how dazzling satellites and other space jamming techniques can lead to debris in space, thereby increasing the risk of collision).
74 Louis de Gouyon Matignon, The Kessler Syndrome, SPACE LEGAL ISSUES (Mar. 27,
2019), bhttps://www.spacelegalissues.com/space-law-the-kessler-syndrome/.
75 COLBY, supra note 13, at 11.
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armoring is prohibitively heavy to launch into orbit.76 Some have proposed increasing the number and location of satellites while reducing
costs to build redundancy in the satellite infrastructure.77 Regardless of
the technical feasibility of these efforts, building deterrence by denial is
expensive.78 If China makes a serious effort to develop technology to exploit these vulnerabilities, the cost will continue to increase as technology evolves. China’s economic growth and large population might mean
that the U.S. is at a disadvantage when it comes to a spending race to
ensure effective deterrence. Recognizing the significant costs and concerns with a deterrence-only strategy, commentators have proposed
arms control to focus or mitigate an unrestrained arms race.79 Anti-satellite technology is already widespread among space-faring nations, but
an agreement limiting or prohibiting testing or use that creates debris
makes sense.80 A focus on restricting behavior, such as the use of debriscausing ASAT weapons, is a good candidate for inclusion.81
B.

The Limitations and Opportunities for Arms Control in Space

Arms race proposals are most practical when they recognize that
states will only agree to arms control tangential to their core security
interests. As Prof. Koplow has observed, “countries have legally obligated themselves only to refrain from the particular weapons behaviors
that they did not want to – or did not have the capacity to – undertake
anyway.”82 Among the more reasonable proposals, Prof. Koplow, and
76 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 316–17 (explaining
how to strategize satellites in space in anticipation of future satellite attacks from foreign countries).
77 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 317.
78 Id. at 319–20.
79 See generally Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 332–37
(discussing the costs and concerns of arms control and mitigating an arms race).
80 Beard, supra note 29, at 343–44.
81 See Erwin, supra note 11 (quoting Maj. Gen. DeAnna Burt who stated, “The
Chinese and the Russians have already put weapons in space [...] [W]e’re way past
having a conversation about regulating [anti-satellite weapons] per se, which is why
we focus on norms of behavior [...] I don’t think you can put that genie back in the
bottle.”).
82 David A. Koplow, An Inference about Interference: A Surprising Application of Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 737, 768 (2014); see also MORTON WILLIAM ROYSE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WARFARE 132 (1928) (“[A] weapon will be restricted in
inverse proportion, more or less, to its effectiveness; that the more efficient a weapon
or method of warfare the less likelihood there is of its being restricted in action by the
rules of war.”).
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others, have advocated for a ban on kinetic ASAT testing.83 Kinetic tests
like the Chinese test in 2007, the Indian test in 2019, and the Russian
test in 2021, present a significant risk of space debris which threaten the
productive use of space orbits well in the future.84 Because the U.S., Russia, and China have already demonstrated their kinetic ASAT abilities
and have adopted alternative ASAT technologies,85 it’s considered the
most immediately-beneficial form of arms control available. The hope
is that this initial strategy of non-destruction will serve as the starting
point to more comprehensive arms control compromises between the
U.S., Russia, and China.86 Even if a regime of arms control did develop,
some commentators have cast doubt on their effectiveness if conflict
were to be initiated.87
In line with the well-reasoned academic support for this type of
treaty, U.S. policy makers recently indicated participation and support
for a December 2020 proposal by the U.K. to implement a set of rules of
behavior in space.88 The U.K. proposal adopting a behavior-based approach allowing U.N. members to identify threats and challenges does
not, on its face, seem geared towards a binding treaty.89 Despite this, initial remarks from U.S. Space Command suggest that the U.S. seeks to
pursue a binding agreement. “We’re going to prepare what we believe
will be proposal language that will go to the UN and hopefully result in a
binding resolution,” U.S. Space Command’s Maj. Gen. DeAnna Burt said.90
83 Koplow, Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space, supra note 24, at 363–65 (advocating for restrictions upon the testing in space of specified types of ASAT systems).
84 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 301, 303, 306.
85 Nivedita Raju, EU NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT CONSORTIUM, NO. 74, A
PROPOSAL FOR A BAN ON DESTRUCTIVE ANTI-SATELLITE TESTING: A ROLE FOR THE EUROPEAN
UNION? 1, 3 (2021).
86 Koplow, Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space, supra note 24, at 368–69.
87 Szymanski, supra note 71, at 91–92 (“Most space treaties will be violated in
the first few hours of the coming space war. International treaties have usually been
violated in most previous major terrestrial conflicts and, due to the remoteness of
space, treaties concerning the military use of space are easier to ignore—especially
when the world populace may not even be aware of this ongoing space conflict and
treaty violation truth will be hard to come by.”).
88 Erwin, supra note 11.
89 G.A. Res. 75/36, at 3 (Dec. 16, 2020) (The General Assembly “[e]ncourages
Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on
Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and
share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and
principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.”).
90 Erwin, supra note 11.
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Although Maj. Gen. Burt believes that “[t[here’s a lot of good work happening on the international stage,”91 any binding language is unlikely to
gain support from China and Russia, both of which voted against the initial U.N. resolution.92
This would mark the first time in recent history that the U.S. has
made any significant push for any type of formally binding arms control.
The Obama administration did articulate support for the “EU standards
of space conduct,” but ultimately withdrew support for the proposals in
2012.93 This change in policy was likely caused in part by Congressional
concerns over “arms control by the back door” that might limit future
space defense developments in unintended ways.94 Despite the technically non-binding character of the code, implementing regulations by
the executive branch would constrain military activities to the extent required by the terms of the Code.95 Addressing these concerns, Congress
included language in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act that
required executive submission of a certification that “such agreement
has no legally-binding effect or basis for limiting the activities of the
United States in outer space.”96 It is not clear whether this language is
enforceable against the President’s authority to conduct foreign relations but this dispute illustrates the challenge that democracies have in
implementing a strategic shift in defense policy.
It is yet to be seen whether U.S. support for the newly introduced
U.K.-sponsored U.N. resolution through the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space97 will build momentum towards a binding
Id.
Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Placement of Weapons in Outer Space: The Dichotomy Between Word and Deed, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/placement-weapons-outer-space-dichotomy-between-word-anddeed.
93 Michael Listner, US rebuffs current draft of EU Code of Conduct: is there something waiting in the wings?, SPACE REV. (Jan. 16, 2012), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2006/1; see also Michael Listner, U.S. Should Take a Cold, Hard Look
at Space Code of Conduct, SPACENEWS (Apr. 7, 2014), https://spacenews.com/40128us-should-take-a-cold-hard-look-at-space-code-of-conduct/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20should%20take,national%20security%20and%20political%20analysis (“The EU code was rejected by the United
States for several reasons, including national security concerns, but even though the
code of conduct has been substantially overhauled it still does not offer the United
States tangible benefits and potentially places greater burdens and restrictions on the
United States.”).
94 Beard, supra note 29, at 402.
95 Id. at 402–03.
96 Id. at 404.
97 Erwin, supra note 11.
91
92
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agreement or will merely continue the muddled progress on soft-law
norms in space. Any broad proposals that address U.S. defense flexibility
may face hurdles in application. Regardless, the effectiveness of soft law
in constraining the development and utilization of military technology
is questionable.98 The imprecision of standards and the incentive to
cheat on constraints makes the broad norms or standards articulated by
the code less effective. As Prof. Beard notes, during the Cold War, the
U.S. and Russia gravitated towards specific and granular arms control
agreements to confront the issue of cheating in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
model that comprises arms control agreements.99
Thus, if broad arms control is unattainable, the soft law model is
ineffective, and even narrow or targeted treaties lack political will, what
is the solution to the possibility of an unconstrained arms race? The answer is that targeted arms control needs to be part of a larger lawfare
strategy. If lawfare is embraced as a counter to China’s ambitions, arms
control in space is a central piece to that strategy. The biggest reason for
the U.S. to embrace a lawfare strategy, is to capitalize on Beijing’s recent
stumbles in its push to win victories over the U.S. in this arena.
III. LAWFARE AND THE PRC'S "UNRESTRICTED WARFARE" STRATEGY
Thus, U.S. satellites pose an attractive target to potential adversaries and may create challenges in determining the author of an attack.
All this is to say that deterrence by retaliation faces unique risks and
challenges when compared with the more familiar Cold War paradigm.
The contemporary concept of the term “lawfare” was first popularized just after the U.S.-led military campaign in Kosovo.100 Major General Dunlap introduced the idea that adversaries aim to exploit Western

98 Beard, supra note 29, at 367 (“While soft law may lay the foundation for the
development of hard law regimes in other fields, in the context of arms control it may
instead merely generate new sources of uncertainty and conflict. When indeterminate language is used to establish key rules in arms control agreements, no credible
commitments are signaled by states. Concurrently, offensive defections may be hard
to identify, little assurance is signaled to prevent states from engaging in defensive
defections, and some states may become “defensive quasi-defectors” as they unilaterally interpret (in a self-serving manner) ambiguous key rules.”).
99 Id. at 418.
100 About Lawfare: A Brief History of the Term and the Site, LAWFARE,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/about-lawfare-brief-history-term-and-site (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
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legal values to handcuff and to defeat the U.S.101 The term is best defined
as “the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional
military means to achieve an operational objective.”102 In the context of
strategic international law, and space law in particular, the term refers
to law’s use as an offensive weapon aimed at controlling opponents and
seizing political initiative.103 The U.S. has largely dominated international rulemaking in space.104 Bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
yielded space treaties that serve as the foundation of the space legal regime and the U.S. has continued to shape the interpretation and application of law in space.105 In particular, the meaning of “peaceful purposes”
in the Outer Space Treaty is largely seen to include the lawful deployment of weapons in accordance with the U.N. Charter.106 As China
emerged as a space power, it purposefully incorporated lawfare aimed
at the U.S. to further its strategic goals.107 These efforts have included a
push for recognition of vertical sovereignty, arguing for control of space
beyond internationally accepted norms.108 When these arguments
failed to gain traction, China supported Russian efforts to adopt a draft
Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
(“PPWT”), proposed in 2008 and 2014.109
A.

The PPWT as Lawfare in Space
In the space context, PPWT is at the forefront of China’s efforts to

101 Lawfare amid warfare, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2007), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/03/lawfare-amid-warfare/ (referencing Maj. Gen.
Dunlap’s 2001 essay first introducing the term “Lawfare”).
102 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, YALE J. INT’L AFFAIRS 146,
146 (2008).
103 Dean Cheng, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare, Asia Report
(Heritage Found.), May 18, 2012, at 1.
104 See Milton “Skip” Smith, The Space Law Review: USA, L. REVIEWS (Dec. 17,
2020), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-space-law-review/usa.
105 See OFF. TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-TM-STI-27, U.S. - SOVIET COOPERATION IN SPACE:
A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 9 (1985); HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 3–4 (Frons von der Dunk
& Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
106 HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 105, at 314.
107 Mitchell Ford, War on the Final Frontier: Can Twentieth-Century Space Law
Combat Twenty-First-Century Warfare?, 39 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 237, 258–59 (2017) (describing three types of warfare in Chinese writings (1) public opinion warfare, (2)
psychological warfare, and (3) legal warfare).
108 Bret Austin White, Reordering the Law for a China World Order: China’s Legal
Warfare Strategy in Outer Space and Cyberspace, 11 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 435, 458
(2021).
109 Beard, supra note 29, at 416.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss1/3

18

Fall 2021

Securing Precipitous Heights

99

curtail the U.S.’ technological advantage in space.110 While the U.S. has
repeatedly blocked adoption of the treaty and publicly criticized its
terms as ill-defined and impossible to verify,111 the PPWT has been useful to its sponsors, Russia and China, who have revised and redrafted
proposals of the treaty and presented it to the international community.112 Rather than a workable solution to an arms race, the PPWT is
heavily biased towards Chinese and Russian interests to the detriment
of the U.S. and its allies.
China has pursued a robust and comprehensive array of counterspace weapons, including ground-launched ASAT missiles, ground-based
directed energy weapons, ground-based satellite jammers, computer network operations, and co-orbital ASAT systems. The PPWT is ideal for preserving these capabilities: it would allow China to continue developing and
deploying ground-based counterspace assets, testing ground-based weapons against its own spacecraft even if such tests created debris, and testing
ground-based weapons against foreign spacecraft so long as these tests did
not inflict physical damage. The PPWT would also favor China and Russia
by prohibiting space-based “weapons'' under broad terms that could include satellites that support missile defense systems on the ground—
which these countries have long opposed—while allowing the terrestrialbased weapons that pose the greatest threat to space systems.113

The U.S., as the leading power in space and space-based weaponry,
would have its ambitions curtailed, while the terrestrial-based weapons
to combat the U.S. advantage would go unregulated under the PPWT.
Further, the PPWT only bans weapons specially designed as weapons,114
110 See Bowe, supra note 17, at 1 (describing how the PPWT is aimed at restricting orbiting space weapons, but not terrestrial ASAT weapons which are central to
Chinese security posturing in space).
111 Ford, supra note 107, at 254–55.
112 See Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intel., Statement for the Record: Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, (May 11, 2017) (“Russia and
China remain committed to developing capabilities to challenge perceived adversaries in space, especially the United States, while publicly and diplomatically promoting nonweaponization of space and “no first placement” of weapons in space.”);
see also Rebecca Arcesati, China’s space program is about more than soft power,
MERICS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://merics.org/en/analysis/chinas-space-programabout-more-soft-power (“China has been eager to present itself as a peaceful and
trustworthy space power opposed to arms races in outer space and committed to
multilateralism. Such a narrative appeals to developing countries lacking autonomous space capabilities. It also seems to persuade the European Space Agency.”).
113 Bowe, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting the Russian minister’s response to the U.S.
Defense Space Strategy).
114 Louis de Gouyon Matignon, Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons
in
Outer
Space,
SPACE LEGAL NEWS
(May
8,
2019),
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but any object or satellite that has navigation and communication can be
used as a weapon – slam it into another satellite and create debris. The
Chinese government is aware of U.S. opposition but has made no significant move to modify the treaty's contours in a way acceptable to U.S.
interests.115 The value of the treaty to its sponsors is not necessarily curtailing an arms race, but rather an opportunity to paint the U.S. as uninterested in taking reasonable steps to protect the global commons of
space from a damaging arms race.116 The goal of presenting the U.S. pursuit of national security as destabilizing rather than stabilizing has some
support in legal academia and is in line with the goals of so-called “revisionist powers.”117
The U.S. has largely been content to point out the flaws in the PPWT,
concluding that the PPWT does not offer a sincere or serious avenue for
reaching agreement.118 But the EU does not explicitly share America’s
cynicism about China’s proposal or its potential for cooperation. 119 Russia, another so-called revisionist power, is an eager co-sponsor of the
treaty.120 Thus, two of the three advanced space faring nations, the PRC
and Russia, have repeatedly pushed a one-sided treaty while publicly
declaring their interest in responsible cooperation in space.121 There is
some indication this strategy is working on a political level.
https://www.spacelegalissues.com/treaty-on-the-prevention-of-the-placement-ofweapons-in-outer-space-the-threat-or-use-of-force-against-outer-space-objects/.
115 Coats, supra note 112, at 8.
116 Outer Space: Militarization, weaponization, and prevention of an arms race,
REACHING CRITICAL WILL, https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/factsheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space (last visited Nov. 26, 2021).
117 C.f. Hauck, supra note 52, at 120 (arguing that the creation of a Space Force
amounts to U.S. “imperialism” in space); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (2018) (“It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want
to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority
over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.”).
118 Jeff Foust, U.S. Dismisses Space Weapons Treaty Proposal as “Fundamentally
Flawed”, SPACENEWS (Sept. 11, 2014), https://spacenews.com/41842us-dismissesspace-weapons-treaty-proposal-as-fundamentally-flawed/ (outlining U.S. concerns
with the PPWT, including the lack of a verification mechanism and no restrictions on
the development and stockpiling of anti-satellite (“ASAT”) weapons on the ground).
119 Arcesati, supra note 112 (“The ESA has long been keen to work with China,
particularly on scientific missions for which pooling resources is key to success. Last
year, the European space industry expressed wariness of the Trump administration’s
vision of US dominance in space.”).
120 ANGELA STENT, RUSSIA AND CHINA: AXIS OF REVISIONIST? 1 (Brookings 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/russia-and-china-axis-of-revisionists/.
121 Michael Listner & Rajeswari P. Rajagopalan, The 2014 PPWT: a new draft but
with the same and different problems, SPACE REV. (Aug. 11, 2014),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/2575/1.
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The European Space Agency (“ESA”) has embraced the PRC as a
partner in space and worked to strengthen ties to Chinese space projects.122 But the PRC’s economic leverage is weakened by its systematic
violations of human rights. Three months after China and the EU signed
a trade deal, reciprocal sanctions between the EU and China based on
human rights concerns in Xinjiang threaten the future of Europe’s economic partnership with China.123 As economic decoupling accelerates
between the U.S. and China, the EU is faced with a tension between its
values and its economic interests. Europe’s multi-track approach of cooperating economically with China while drawing a contrast on values
issues like human rights may be untenable. China for its part, seems unwilling to tolerate criticism while preserving close economic ties.124
The PPWT is just one example of China’s attempt to complement its
economic power with a push for legal legitimacy. China and Russia are
pursuing the same strategy in cyberspace where Russia and China have
leveraged the U.N. General Assembly to form a U.N. cyber discussion
body intended to supplant the Budapest convention on cybercrime with
a new treaty consistent with their strategic interests (discussed further
below).125 The PRC and Russia’s unity in repeatedly proposing the
PPWT demonstrated that they believe it has successfully increased their
political power. While the PPWT has not been offered since 2014, this
is likely because China no longer needed it as a wedge between the U.S.
and its allies during the Trump administration, which was rhetorically
deemphasizing multilateral cooperation.126 Indeed, the lawfare element
122 ESA and Chinese astronauts train together, EUR. SPACE AGENCY (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/Astronauts/ESA_and_Chinese_astronauts_train_together.
123 Stuart Lau, China’s new bogeyman: Europe, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2021, 8:21 PM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/chinas-new-bogeyman-europe/; see also Adam
Tooze, The Fragility of Europe’s China Strategy, INTERNATIONALE POLITIK Q. (Mar. 30,
2021), https://ip-quarterly.com/en/fragility-europes-china-strategy (explaining the
roadblocks to China’s continued advancement).
124 See Vincent K. L. Chang & Frank N. Pieke, Europe’s engagement with China:
shifting Chinese views of the EU and the EU-China relationship, 16 ASIA EUR. J. 317, 321
(2018).
125 David Ignatius, How Russian and China are attempting to rewrite cyberworld
order, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2021, 7:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-russia-and-china-are-attempting-to-rewrite-cyberworldorder/2021/03/30/16030226-9190-11eb-a74e-1f4cf89fd948_story.html.
126 See generally Lillian Posner & Evan Sankey, The U.S. and Russia are Parting
Ways in Space and That’s Risky, NAT’L INTEREST (May 7, 2021), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-and-russia-are-parting-ways-space-and-thats-risky-184506 (describing China’s general bypassing of the PPWT, and the winding down of the Treaty’s
effectiveness and import).
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of the PRC’s political warfare is central to their attempt to increase
power relative to the U.S. The PPWT is a clear example of law used as
bludgeon, something U.S. policy makers should not ignore.
B. The Chinese Government’s Conception of Political and Legal
Warfare
The PRC’s ambitions require the dismantling or sidelining of the
U.S.-led order created after World War II. Lawfare plays a key role in
this attempt to “diminish the credibility of US power and influence sufficiently to cause those states currently inclined to “balance” against
China to instead join the bandwagon with China.”127 U.S.-led security alliances and democratic norms are seen as incompatible with the Chinese
government’s ambition during the next century.128 This strategy does
not necessarily include military confrontation but rather, what Chinese
writings refer to as the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.129 The three concepts are seen as
interrelated and mutually reinforcing.130 In discussing this concept,
Dean Cheng defines the Chinese conception of legal warfare.
Legal warfare is one of the key instruments of psychological and public opinion/media warfare. It raises doubts among adversary and neutral
military and civilian authorities, as well as the broader population, about
the legality of adversary actions, thereby diminishing political will and support—and potentially retarding military activity. It also provides material
for public opinion/media warfare. Legal warfare does not occur on its
own; rather, it is part of the larger military or public opinion/media warfare campaign.131

Key to utilizing legal warfare is a historical conception of the rule of law
that is distinct from the Western tradition. The idea that the law exists
independent of the ruler and the governed and binds them equally is not
rooted in the PRC’s historical experience. Rather, law is seen from an
instrumental perspective, as a tool with which authority may be used to
127 THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 22, at 8 (arguing that China intends to use
its “growing influence within international institutions to delegitimize and overturn
initiatives, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to China’s interests . . . while
advancing a new, hierarchical, authoritarian conception of international order.”).
128 Tobin, supra note 14, at 156 (“Xi, however, has gone much further than his
predecessors to promote his vision for transforming global governance. For Xi,
China’s growing comprehensive national power means that Beijing has greater ability
— and faces a greater urgency — to achieve its long-held aspirations.”).
129 Cheng, supra note 103.
130 Id.
131 Cheng, supra note 103.
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control the governed.132 This historical conception is combined with the
Chinese Government’s acknowledgment that despite rapid growth,
China is not yet ready to effectively confront U.S. military dominance.133
C. The Chinese Government’s “Three Warfares” and its response to
American Influence
In the late 1990s, two Chinese military officers published a book on
“Unrestricted Warfare,” arguing that PRC strategists should investigate
alternative forms to traditional warfare.134 They suggest that due to
China’s relative technological and military disadvantage, it was necessary to pursue alternative ways to wage warfare.135 These alternatives
included international diplomacy, economic pressure, legal warfare and
public opinion.136 Though written two decades ago, the article outlined
the PRC’s view on world politics and how international law has shaped
the rules-based order led by the U.S. in the aftermath of WWII.137
Fundamentally, the PRC’s understanding of the international legal
system is that it was built to serve U.S. interests to the detriment of
China.138 To address this concern, the authors introduce the concept of
“unrestricted warfare,” the idea that utilizing any available method of
coercion is necessary to reshape the international system to one more
conducive to the PRC’s aims.139 In discussing this strategy, the authors
point out what they see as the American emphasis on weaponry and
technology as a means of power and deterrence.140
Americans have a strong inborn [...] tendency to turn their pursuit of
the highest technology and its perfection into a luxury, even including
Id.
See Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr., USFS (Ret.), China’s Challenge to
American Hegemony, Remarks to the Global Strategy Forum (Jan. 20, 2010) (describing China’s lack of “rule of law,” the U.S. as a hegemonic military power, and China’s
reluctance to challenge the U.S. despite its “economic success”).
134 QIAO LIANG & WANG XIANGSUI, UNRESTRICTED WARFARE 2, 7, 221 (Foreign Broad.
Info. Serv. trans., 1999).
135 Andrés B. Munoz Mosquera & Nikoleta Chalanouli, China, an Active Practitioner Of Legal Warfare, LAWFIRE (Feb. 2, 2020), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2020/02/02/guest-post-andres-munoz-mosqueras-and-nikoleta-chalanoulisessay-china-an-active-practitioner-of-legal-warfare/.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 14, at 157 (explaining how for Beijing, democracy
in international relations means “shifting global influence away from Washington and
U.S. allies and toward China and other countries that accede to its concepts.”).
139 Mosquera & Chalanouli, supra note 135.
140 Id.
132
133
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weapons and machinery [...] This inclination makes them rigidly infatuated
with and therefore have blind faith in technology and weapons, always
thinking that the road to getting the upper hand with war can be found
with technology and weapons. This inclination also makes them anxious
at any given time that their own leading position in the realm of weaponry
is wavering, and they continually alleviate these concerns by manufacturing more, newer, and more complex weapons [...] They believe that as long
as the Edisons of today do not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always
be open to Americans. Self-confidence such as this has made them forget
one simple fact - it is not so much that war follows the fixed race course of
rivalry of technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually
changing direction and many irregular factors.141

The authors have thus diagnosed the American inclination towards strategic deterrence facilitated by a reliance on technological superiority.
Prof. Koplow has echoed this critique of American policy makers, suggesting that deterrence in the U.S. is a “MacGuffin,” or a motivating goal
that is divorced from its practical utility.142 The Chinese authors suggest
that the PRC should not compete directly with U.S. technological and
military advantages.143 The authors urge the PRC to find alternatives by
which to mitigate the U.S.’ military and technical advantages.144 This includes redefining the rules by which strategic power is exercised and
maintained.145 In confronting America’s rules-based world order, the
authors recommend that China embrace an approach of “unrestricted
warfare.”
[W]arfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers,
military units, and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter

141 LIANG & XIANGSUI, supra note 134, at 95, 114–15 (stating “observing, considering, and resolving problems from the point of view of technology is typical American thinking. Its advantages and disadvantages are both very apparent, just like the
characters of Americans.”).
142 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 294.
143 See generally LIANG & XIANGSUI, supra note 134, at 2 (arguing that “strong”
countries should not use the same approach as “weak” countries in military advancement and suggesting the U.S. is a “strong” country).
144 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 294.
145 See LIANG & XIANGSUI, supra note 134, at 196 (stating that “rules must be respected. To evade or break the rules requires prudence. The issue is that what we
are thinking about is precisely how to evade or break such rules. We do not believe
that all wars must gradually progress in level-by-level sequence, accumulating until a
fateful moment of destiny is reached. We believe that moment is something which
can be created. Finding a way by which we can continuously create that moment and
not wait for the accumulation, and then fixing that method as a kind of strategy, that
is the thing which we should do.”).
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for politicians, scientists, and even bankers [...] Although the boundaries
between soldiers and non-soldiers have now been broken down, and the
chasm between warfare and non-warfare nearly filled up, globalization has
made all the tough problems interconnected and interlocking, and we
must find a key for that. The key should be able to open all the locks, if
these locks are on the front door of war. And this key must be suited to all
the levels and dimensions, from war policy, strategy, and operational techniques to tactics; and it must also fit the hands of individuals, from politicians and generals to the common soldiers. We can think of no other more
appropriate key than "unrestricted warfare."146

Subsequent authors have endorsed this view of the PRC’s conception of
its place in the international order, namely a rising power confronting
an international legal system designed to protect the interests of the
United States.147 Commentators have also posited that U.S. reliance on
technology for the national security realm is both a strength and a weakness.148 Being unable to compete directly with the U.S. in terms of military or technological might,149 China has embraced alternative means to
advance state power. This alternative means includes arguments on
vertical sovereignty in space and the PPWT, a new push to shape cyber
law through a new cybercrime treaty, and attempts to build legal cover
for the PRC’s territorial aims in the South China Sea.150
U.S. policy makers must thus understand China’s place in the
rules-based international order (“RBIO”) the way PRC strategists understand China’s place. The PRC’s hostility to the RBIO is based on the perception it constrains China’s ambitions regarding space, Taiwan, the
South China Sea, cyber space, and Chinese domestic policy.151 The PRC’s
Id. at 221–22.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Military and Security Development Involving the
Peoples’ Republic of China (2020) (discussing China’s foreign policy to readdress its
place in the “international order”).
148 Steven L. Bryant, Jr., The Dangers of an Over-Reliance on Technology (June
14, 2011) (Master’s thesis, National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College)
(available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=722986).
149 Bates Gill & Michael E. O’Hanlon, China’s Hollow Military, BROOKINGS (June 1,
1999), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-hollow-military/.
150 See Jonathan G. Odom, Debunking a New Chinese Talking Point Against U.S.
Policy in the South China Sea, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/debunking-new-chinese-talking-point-against-us-policy-south-china-sea
(characterizing the PRC’s attempt to claim territory in the South China Sea as “sovereignty issues” and U.S. policy opposing its aims as illegitimate); see also Ignatius, supra
note 125 (discussing China and Russia’s UNGA sanctioned push to draft a new treaty
on cybercrime and creation of a UN cyber discussion body).
151 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 147 (discussing China’s view that the
rules-based system hinders its strategic ambitions and is contrary to its sovereignty).
146
147
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current leadership under Xi Jinping can disregard human rights and rule
of law under the RBIO because they see it as an American system designed to promote American interests.152 In response to U.S. Secretary
of State Andrew Blinken’s call to strengthen the rules-based international order, China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi stated:
What China and the international community follow or uphold is the
United Nations-centered international system and the international order
underpinned by international law, not what is advocated by a small number of countries of the so-called “rules-based” international order. And the
United States has its style – United States-style democracy – and China has
the Chinese-style democracy.153

China is thus defining the RBIO as a subjective statement of values
as opposed to a universal set of rules applying to all nation states.
Whether the U.S. pursues a policy of containment, attempts to integrate China into the current international system, or works to establish
a new cooperative balance of power, it must acknowledge the PRC’s interest in undermining the U.S.-led status quo.154 From a containment
perspective, if China views the RBIO as constraining its rise in power relative to the U.S., the U.S. must understand the RBIO as a system that protects its relative power.155 Thus, foreign policy realists should
acknowledge the importance of the RBIO to U.S. interests. If the U.S. is
to effectively address PRC lawfare, the rules governing space provides a
unique opportunity.
D. Lawfare is Central to Chinese Ambitions, it Cannot Rely on
Economic Might Alone
It could be argued that China is building its growing influence on
economic power and that lawfare ambitions are secondary. Indeed, the
152 See Ignatius, supra note 125 (stating that “China’s top diplomat had an interesting rejoinder to Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s call in Anchorage this month
to “strengthen the rules-based international order.” Such an order already exists, answered Politburo member Yang Jiechi. It’s called the United Nations.”).
153 Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks: Secretary Antony J. Blinken,
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Director Yang And State Councilor Wang At
the Top of Their Meeting (Mar. 18, 2021).
154 Cf. Paal, supra note 4 (mentioning that “[a] policy that combines engagement
with China with attention to nurturing a balance of power around Beijing as a hedge
will best serve U.S. interests. In that spirit, the United States will need to find a pragmatic basis for bilateral relations with China that protects what is working and helps
adjust what is not.”).
155 Odom, supra note 150.
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Belt and Road initiative seems primarily aimed at infrastructure development in exchange for access to markets and resource rights.156
China’s international political clout may stem more from economic influence than a compelling vision for world governance.157 But as China
is discovering, its influence and economic power may be undermined by
its political liabilities.158 There is a threshold to China’s ambition that
economic incentives cannot overcome. Recent developments in Korea
and the EU are illustrative.159
In December 2020, the EU and the PRC signed a historic trade deal
while the U.S. was managing its pandemic response and navigating an
unresolved electoral dispute.160 But after a few months passed, these
increased economic ties between the PRC and the EU are on much shakier ground. For one, European leaders, who hoped they could bifurcate
expanding economic cooperation and support for human rights, soon
became embroiled in mutual economic sanctions over Chinese human
rights abuses in Xinjiang province.161 A swift backlash against European
goods occurred after various EU officials criticized Beijing’s treatment of
Uyghurs.162 As a result, this dispute may result in a closer relationship
between the U.S. and Europe, with China somewhat excluded. All showing that political and cultural disagreements upending otherwise profitable Chinese economic arrangements is not limited to Western Countries.
156 Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Jan. 28, 2020, 7:00AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
157 Id. (explaining the common differences between China and other actors in
their world outlooks).
158 See Lau, supra note 123.
159 Id.; Tobias Harris & Haneul Lee, A New Chapter in U.S.-South Korea Relations:
Seoul Embraces a Broader Role in Asia, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (June 25, 2021, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2021/06/25/500953/new-chapter-u-s-south-korea-relations-seoul-embraces-broader-role-asia/.
160 Rob Schmitz, Europe and China Approve Landmark Investment Treaty, Snubbing
U.S.,
NPR
(Dec.
30,
2020,
12:47
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/30/951400927/europe-and-china-approve-landmark-investment-treaty-snubbing-u-s.
161 Guiseppe Succimarra, EU Sanctions China For Human Rights Abuses In Xinjiang, HUM. RTS. PULSE (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/eu-sanctions-china-for-human-rights-abuses-in-xinjiang.
162 Adela Suliman, Nike, H&M, Burberry face backlash and boycotts in China over
stance on Uyghur treatment, NBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2021, 10:11 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nike-h-m-face-backlash-china-over-xinjiang-cotton-concerns-n1262019.
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South Korea, long a U.S. ally, recently began moving towards a more
ambiguous foreign policy concerning the growing rivalry between the
U.S. and the PRC.163 Korea is a vibrant democracy defined by hardship
in the first half of the 20th century and astonishing economic development in the second.164 It has always been aware of its vulnerable status
in a “tough neighborhood,” caught between Chinese, Japanese, and
American behemoths.165 But its attempts to navigate an independent
course between Beijing and the U.S. is challenged by popular resentment
against perceived Chinese political and cultural overreach.166 Koreans
expressed outrage over suggestions that kimchi, a beloved national dish,
and the hanbok, a traditional Korean clothing, originated in China.167
The PRC’s financial backing of the Korean entertainment industry forced
a rewrite of a popular drama based on depictions conflating Korean and
Chinese cultural history.168 Korean popular resentment over Chinese
cultural imperialism was previously reinforced by $7.5 billion of economic sanctions imposed by Beijing in 2016 over Seoul’s’ hosting of the
American Terminal High Altitude Area defense system.169 While President Moon’s administration maintained a focus on strategic ambiguity
between Beijing and Washington, the political and cultural realities in
Korea may make a future close relationship with China untenable.
These cases are offered to demonstrate that China’s world-wide
163 See Dongwoo Kim, The Politics of South Korea’s ‘China Threat’, DIPLOMAT (Apr.
5, 2021), https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-politics-of-south-koreas-chinathreat/ (“There is a mismatch between this strong anti-China sentiment in the public
and South Korea’s current foreign policy. This, combined with external environments
that make the policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ vis-à-vis China and the United States increasingly difficult and the hyper-partisan, polarized political landscape, could altogether transform China policy into a key wedge issue in South Korea’s politics in the
coming years.”).
164 Charles K. Armstrong, Korean History and Political Geography, ASIA SOC’Y,
https://asiasociety.org/education/korean-history-and-political-geography#
(last
visited Nov. 26, 2021).
165 Robert Kelly, Forging Autonomy in a Tough Neighborhood: Korea’s Foreign
Policy Struggle, ASIAN SEC. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2009), https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/09/14/“forging-autonomy-in-a-tough-neighborhood
-korea’s-foreign-policy-struggle”-1/.
166 See, e.g., Greeshma Nayak, South Korean Drama ‘Joseon Exorcist’ Sparks Controversy Over Portrayal of Chinese Culture, REPUBLICWORLD.COM (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.republicworld.com/entertainment-news/web-series/south-koreandrama-joseon-exorcist-sparks-controversy-over-portrayal-of-chinese-culture.html
(detailing controversy over popular Chinese-funded Korean drama featuring Chinese
culture on a Korean television show).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Kim, supra note 163.
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influence cannot rest on economic incentives alone. China’s strategic
vulnerability lies in the fact that its sovereignty-focused nationalism
does not provide a compelling narrative for prospective partner nations.170 While nations including EU countries and S. Korea may be able
to ignore this in the short run, in the long run, Beijing cannot secure long
term alliances without promoting externally compatible values. U.S. values including economic and political liberalism supported by the rule of
law remains one of its most attractive characteristics when engaging
with the world community. These values endure and remain compelling
regardless of economic and military influence. The RBIO acts as a vehicle
for these values and undergirds market access and economic cooperation.171
Chinese lawfare provides a veneer of legitimacy that amounts to a
papering over of its foundational weakness as a world leader. If America
fails to assert its role as a global leader in forming and enforcing international law and norms, China will exploit the vacuum with proposed
but ultimately untenable legal regimes like the PPWT while ignoring adverse rulings like the Philippines Law of the Sea Decision.172 America’s
response must include targeted, well defined, and verifiable binding
treaties, starting with a ban on destructive ASAT tests. But it must be
more than just an American sponsored reverse PPWT, aimed at curtailing opponents while protecting advantage. It can be narrow enough to
allow continued development of deterrence technology while restricting new debris-causing tests by emerging space powers. China and Russia share this interest in the continued productive use of space. But even
if ultimately rejected by China and Russia, U.S. support for globally beneficial rules distinguish its vision of a future governed by law rather than
Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, Liberal World: The Resilient Order,
FOREIGN AFF. 18 (July/Aug. 2018), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/05_deudney_ikenberry.pdf (“Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and
freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in
spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have
extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela.”).
171 Deudney & Ikenberry, supra note 170, at 16.
172 Anders Corr, Enforce Law Of The Sea Ruling: Stand With The Philippines Now,
Or Later Face China Alone, FORBES (July 13, 2016, 6:19 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/07/13/enforce-law-of-the-searuling-stand-with-the-philippines-now-or-later-face-chinaalone/?sh=52a701b7da56 (explaining that the U.S. and its allies are the only countries with the power to enforce the Philippines Law of the Sea ruling, as China chooses
to defy it).
170
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one dominated only by economic and military influence. This is particularly true in the realm of military activities where voluntary restraints
are of limited utility between potential rivals.
IV. LAWFARE IN SPACE AS A PART OF A BROADER AMERICAN STRATEGY
The U.S.’ recent endorsement of a plan to develop “binding norms”
is a first attempt to meaningfully confront the PRC’s attempts to reframe
the narrative in space.173 Until recently, it had either pursued deterrence while ignoring Chinese lawfare or half-heartedly endorsed the
EU’s soft law approach for a Code of Space Conduct.174 Its participation
in the 2019 U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space guidelines of sustainability was a positive step forward.175 But a focus on soft
law or military deterrence alone misses the opportunity to seize a lawfare advantage over China and restrengthen the rules-based order.
The Artemis Accords, setting forth principles for cooperation
aimed at civil exploration, are a positive development for the space legal
regime.176 But neither Russia nor China has signed on to the accords but
have their intent to cooperate together on a parallel space discovery
project.177 Regardless, NASA is restricted from cooperation with China
based on a 2011 statute aimed at preventing American technology from
being exploited by the Chinese government.178 The portions of the Artemis Accords aimed at restricting space debris are helpful in establishing
Erwin, supra note 11.
See Marcus Weisgerber, U.S. Wants Changes to EU Space Code of Conduct,
SPACENEWS (Jan. 12, 2012, 6:23 PM), https://spacenews.com/18667us-wantschanges-to-eu-space-code-of-conduct/ (explaining that the U.S. will no longer endorse the EU’s Code of Space Conduct).
175 See generally Peter Martinez, The UN COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-Term
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Nov. 2019),
https://swfound.org/media/206891/swf_un_copuos_lts_guidelines_fact_sheet_november-2019-1.pdf (highlighting that the U.S.’s endorsement and participation of
these plans is a recent, and promising development).
176 See generally The Artemis Accords, Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes (Oct. 13,
2020) (generally supporting the idea of international cooperative space exploration
under the principles set forth by the Artemis Accords).
177 Morgan McFall-Johnsen, China and Russia haven’t signed on to NASA’s new
plan to unify how humanity explores space, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2020, 12:52 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/nasa-artemis-accords-deep-space-explorationmoon-mars-asteroids-comets-2020-10; Steven Lee Meyers, China and Russia Agree to
Explore the Moon Together, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/10/world/asia/china-russia-moon.html.
178 Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1340, 125 Stat. 38, 123 (amended in 2020).
173
174
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U.S. leadership by example, but they do not directly engage Chinese or
Russian space activities.179 Further, as Prof. Beard noted in his critique
of the International Code of Conduct for Space activities, soft law efforts
to create arms control norms suffer from imprecise terms and, thus,
makes determining whether a state party has violated the norms difficult to discern.180 The Artemis Accords lack a meaningful way of holding
China or Russia accountable for irresponsible behavior.
The PRC’s unrestricted warfare approach is that because it is untethered to any universal or compelling vision of a structured world order and is vulnerable to hypocrisy, contradiction, and self-sabotage.181
If the PRC’s international strategy is motivated by no principle other
than maximizing its government’s power, then the U.S. is compelled to
exploit this strategy where it is vulnerable.182 Chinese actions in cyberspace and in the sea are additional examples where an assertive U.S. approach to regain the moral international narrative will have achievable
results.183 America should aggressively confront the Chinese narrative
over the weapons in outer space as part of a larger push to confront
China’s irresponsible actions on the international stage.
A.

The Limits of Soft Law Alone

A U.K.-sponsored December 2020 General Assembly resolution
and the U.S.’ initial reaction to it are perhaps the most recent significant
developments in space security law. While Maj. General Burt was
quoted as saying the U.S. would support a binding UN resolution,184 it is
not clear yet what this means. If this means a targeted treaty with specific terms and a verification regime, it may very well accomplish the
lawfare goals advocated in this paper. If, however, it becomes a project
McFall-Johnsen, supra note 177.
Beard, supra note 29, at 423.
181 Id. at 358–60.
182 THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 22, at 66 (“U.S. strategy must never forget
the innately realist nature of the Chinese strategy that it is seeking to defeat. Chinese
leaders respect strength and are contemptuous of weakness. They respect consistency and are contemptuous of vacillation. China does not believe in strategic vacuums.”).
183 See Ariel Levite & Lyu Jinghua, Chinese-American Relations in Cyberspace: Towards Collaboration or Confrontration?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Jan. 24,
2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/24/chinese-american-relationsin-cyberspace-toward-collaboration-or-confrontation-pub-78213 (explaining how a
cyberattack between China and the U.S. could quickly escalate, and the democratic
ideologies of the U.S. would morally prevail).
184 Erwin, supra note 11 (noting that The U.S. is working with the U.K., Canada,
France, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand).
179
180
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aimed at a political commitment with the hope that state practice will
solidify into customary international law, it comes with associated pitfalls. The danger is that this new project will suffer the same defects as
the EU’s Code of Conduct that fizzled after losing U.S. endorsement during the Obama Administration.185 Prof. Beard highlighted the inapplicability of political commitments to security issues when critiquing the recent emphasis on so-called “soft law.”186 It remains to be seen whether
the new U.K./U.S. project will avoid these pitfalls.
Prof. Beard points out the inherent disadvantage the U.S. suffers
when applying non-binding political commitments in the shadow of autocratic regimes like Russia and China.187 Non-binding commitments
carry more force for democracies that face consequences for straying
from political obligations.188 Soft law agreements like the Code or political commitments that might emerge from the U.K.’s U.N. project depend
entirely on self-enforcement and social verification from member
states.189 Authoritarian states are not subject to the same scrutiny without domestic private interest groups to freely evaluate military programs in light of international commitments.190 If arms control necessarily incentivizes self-interested defection, the weight of corrective
political pressure rests more lightly on autocratic regimes.191 This is
particularly true with the focus on lawfare. China has greater control
over its domestic political narrative than the U.S. when seeking to shape
the dialogue around the commitment to and development of new rules
governing space. Thus, the PRC has a greater opportunity to press the
boundaries of vaguely defined commitments or weak verification regimes.192
But the U.S. has another option, advocating for legally binding
prohibition on specific types of the most harmful conduct. This agreement should be narrowly tailored and include precise terms and feasible

Beard, supra note 29, at 391–94.
Id. at 374.
187 Id. at 338, 359, 393 (explaining a number of general disadvantages to the U.S.
under soft law space agreements with respect to Russia and China).
188 Id. at 399.
189 Id. at 375.
190 Id. at 374–77.
191 Beard, supra note 29, at 360–61, 374 (explaining that arms control incentivizes defection and that authoritarian states’ political committees carry less weight
than democratic ones).
192 Id. at 376 (detailing that authoritarian regimes have advantages over democratic regimes in securing soft arms control arrangements).
185
186
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methods of verification.193 In the arena of space debris prevention, a ban
on the testing of destructive debris-generating ASATs avoids the pitfalls
associated with less defined and more sweeping proposals.194 An agreement signed by Russia and the PRC would reduce debris-causing tests
and establish a treaty as a framework for future arms control, but
merely proposing an agreement that China refused to sign would give
the U.S. a secondary lawfare advantage. The U.S. should not propose a
cynical or bad faith proposal like the PPWT which would undermine the
principles of a rules-based order.195 A treaty proposal will yield immediate short-term political benefits to the U.S. and long term global benefits if ultimately agreed to by China and Russia. In particular, this proposal should be aimed at the most damaging ASAT weapons technology,
debris-causing interceptor vehicles, or hit to kill kinetic energy weapons.
A successful prohibition on tests of kinetic energy, hit-to-kill, debris generating ASATs would curtail the spread of weapons technology
that is increasingly becoming widespread.196 A focus on the most threatening current technology avoids the definition and verification problems of a comprehensive arms control agreement. The format of the
proposed agreement should be incorporated into a legally binding international convention that includes the space-faring states along with precise definitions, credible commitments, and clear compliance obligations. Congressional buy-in is necessary to ensure legitimacy and to
underscore U.S. leadership in developing international space law.
Whether the recent U.K.-led project can create a proposal with similar
benefits remains to be seen. Regardless, any proposal should be narrowly tailored, specific, verifiable, and plausible.197 Any lawfare benefit

193 Id. at 362–63, 416; see also Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note
32, at 345 (“Arms control measures must be prudent, balanced, verifiable, and enforced. Treaties cannot single-handedly and instantaneously abolish all ASAT weapons and counterspace capabilities; diplomacy cannot be simply a reaction to what we
might think of as “deterrence fatigue.””).
194 Beard, supra note 29, at 363–65 (“Determinacy in such agreements appears
to have its own ‘compliance in pull,’ while the absence of determinacy in other agreements makes it unlikely that state will have conjunctions about non-compliance.”).
195 Id. at 390.
196 Id. at 419–20 (“A new wave of destructive ASAT weapon tests is not unimaginable, since countries other than China, Russia, and the United States, including India,
Israel, and Japan; remain interested in developing hit-to-kill ASAT technology.”).
197 Koplow, Deterrence as the MacGuffin, supra note 32, at 345–46 (“None of the
goals of arms control will be easy to attain, especially in the uniquely challenging circumstances of space. But achieving effective arms control in the nuclear realm is not
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hinges on these factors whether the proposal is aimed at ASAT testing
or definitions of hostile behaviors in space.
B.

Confronting the Chinese Government’s Lawfare in Cyberspace

Cyberspace is a unique domain where international cooperation is
particularly compelling.198 The intangibility of cyberspace and growing
reliance across the world means individual sovereign countries are unable to govern or establish controls by acting unilaterally. Despite the
increasing power and relevance of cyberspace, there is a paucity of international treaties or conventions addressing conduct in cyberspace.
In fact, the only significant multilateral treaty governing the internet is
the Budapest Convention.199
The Budapest Convention, otherwise known as the Convention on
Cybercrime, is the only legally binding international treaty that lays out
common standards on cybercrime investigations.200 The goal is to boost
cooperation among criminal justice systems around the globe in these
cases.201 Neither China nor Russia are current members of the Budapest
Convention that was established in 2001.202 More recently, Russia, with
the support of China, successfully pushed a U.N. cybercrime resolution
which may lead to establishment of a second treaty which would act as
a counter to the established Budapest Convention.203 The new
easy, either, and the effort has sometimes succeeded there. The point is that we need
to start trying.”).
198 See Larry D. Welch, Cyberspace – The Fifth Operational Domain, DEF. TECH.
INFO. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/2/20/2011-cyberspace---the-fifth-operational-domain/2011-cyberspace--the-fifth-operational-domain.ashx (discussing the idea of treating cyberspace as its
own domain); see Elena Chernenko et al., Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-international-cooperation-cybersecurityand-adapting-cyber-norms (discussing the “urgent need for cooperation among
states to mitigate threats [of] cybercrime”).
199 Joyce Hakmeh & Allison Peters, A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Jan. 13, 2020, 11:35 AM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-un-cybercrime-treatyway-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet.
200 Allison Peters, Russia and China Are Trying to Set the U.N.’s Rules on Cybercrime, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 16, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/16/russia-and-china-are-trying-to-set-the-u-n-s-rules-on-cybercrime/.
201 Id.
202 Parties/Observers to the Budapest Convention, supra note 15.
203 Deborah Brown, Cybercrime is Dangerous, But a New UN Treaty Could Be
Worse for Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 13, 2021, 12:55 PM),
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resolution and anticipated treaty are regarded in the West as providing
cover for its authoritarian sponsors to crack down on online dissidents.204 The resolution, and Russia’s subsequent draft convention
based on the resolution, provide an extremely vague definition for what
constitutes the use of information and communication technologies for
criminal purposes.205 More importantly, a rival treaty to the Budapest
Convention risks diluting the consensus surrounding the established
treaty. There is speculation that China leveraged its economic power to
convince smaller countries to adopt the resolution which was passed in
2020.206
Regardless of the specific implications of an authoritarian-backed
cyber initiative, Russia and China are committed to establishing alternatives to U.S. supported treaties aimed at bolstering the liberal consensus
on an international stage. The U.S. should be prepared to win cooperation with states who may otherwise be prepared to support a convention that threatens an open, free, and secure internet consistent with liberal values. Of course, this effort to increase support for the Budapest
Convention does not happen in isolation. By adopting a coherent strategy to reestablish rules in space, the U.S. can defend against Russian and
Chinese challenges a consistent legal framework in cyber space. The
PPWT and cyber proposals within the U.N. framework are part of a
larger Chinese and Russian strategy to challenge a universal legal regime. The last PPWT proposal in 2014 and the 2020 Russian/Chinese
push on cyberspace rules should be viewed as the continuation of a lawfare strategy aimed at undermining the current RBIO. U.S. policy must
continue to support international rule making and cooperation or risk
losing control of the international legal narrative.207
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/13/cybercrime-dangerous-new-un-treatycould-be-worse-rights.
204 Hakmeh & Peters, supra note 199.
205 Id.; see also Press Release, The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Draft United Nations Convention on Cooperation in Combating Information Crimes (Feb. 20, 2018) (providing the
text of the convention for references to the vague usage of the indicated language).
206 Samuel Stolton, UN backing of controversial cybercrime treaty raises suspicions, EURACTIV (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/un-backing-of-controversial-cybercrime-treaty-raises-suspicions/.
207 See David Whineray, The United States’ Current and Future Relationships With
the United Nations, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (Mar. 6, 2020), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/06/united-states-current-and-future-relationshipwith-united-nations-pub-81238 (“The Trump Administration has broken away from
this previous Beltway consensus. Since 2017, US foreign policy has become more
transactional, mercantile, nationalist, and unpredictable, with a greater emphasis on
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Confronting the Chinese Government’s Lawfare at Sea

The PRC has heavily utilized lawfare tactics concerning its territorial ambitions at sea.208 China continues to assert control over a historical “nine-dash line” that includes 90% of the South China Sea.209 China’s
claims overlap with the Exclusive Economic Zones (“EZZ”) of Vietnam,
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.210 Despite China’s claimed interest in following international law, it has ignored the rights of EEZ and
other territorial rights recognized by the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (“UNCLOS”) of which China is a party.211 While the U.S. has publicly opposed China’s aggressive stance, it has avoided a direct confrontation over China’s assertiveness.212 China’s strategy to assert broad territorial claims enforced by a massive coast guard presence continues to
create tension in the region. China has maintained this strategy despite
a ground-breaking ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in
2016.213 This ruling, an unequivocal repudiation of China’s maritime
sovereignty and a reduced focus on alliances. The Trump Administration, unlike its
predecessors, has often seen the RBIO as constraining, rather than advancing, US national interests.”).
208 Walton, supra note 10, at 9 (“Over the past decade, military confrontations
between the U.S. and China have exhibited significant international law components,
with China justifying its position in the context of or lack of international law […] In
the future, Chinese Legal Warfare could provide advantages in areas such as treaties
regulating or abolishing the emplacement of weapons in space, or the fielding of antisatellite systems. Overall, Chinese interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea emphasizes that it strengthens stated sovereignty and denies unauthorized
access to foreign militaries.”).
209 Xavier Francis, Indonesia Rejects Chinese Claims To The South China Sea; Says
‘Nine-Dash Line’ Puts Its Interests At Risk, EURASIAN TIMES (June 5, 2020), https://eurasiantimes.com/indonesia-rejects-chinese-claims-to-the-south-china-sea-says-ninedash-line-puts-its-interests-at-risk/.
210 Id.
211 Jon Marek, US-China International Law Disputes in the South China Sea, AIR U.
(July 9, 2021), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2685294/us-china-international-law-disputes-in-the-south-chinasea/.
212 Richard Javad Heydarian, New Biden era of confrontation in the South China
Sea, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://asiatimes.com/2021/01/new-biden-era-ofconfrontation-in-the-south-china-sea/ (“Secretary Blinken also underscored that the
United States rejects China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea to the extent they
exceed the maritime zones that China is permitted to claim under international law
as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.”).
213 Robert D. Williams, Tribunal Issues Landmark Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration, LAWFARE (July 12, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/tribunalissues-landmark-ruling-south-china-sea-arbitration; Jane Perlez, Tribunal Rejects
Beijing’s Claims in South Sea China, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016, 1:13 PM),
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ambitions, presents the U.S. and its allies with an opportunity to press
China on the legal illegitimacy of its claims.214 Along with space, and
cyber, the PRC actions in the East China Sea provide the U.S. with a third
prong for drawing a contrast between its support for a globally beneficial legal consensus and the PRC’s transactional power grabs.
UNCLOS is an international agreement that establishes maritime
zones that delineates the economic and territorial the rights of sovereign states.215 Many of the UNCLOS provisions are generally accepted as
Customary International Law, binding on both signatories and states
who have not officially ratified the agreement.216 UNCLOS established
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), with a mandate to “adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Convention.”217
In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration challenging many of
the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea.218 Surprisingly, the tribunal
clearly and unanimously ruled against China’s claims.219 The PRC did
not recognize the tribunals’ authority and did not participate in the arbitration.220 Among the key holdings, the tribunal determined that the
PRC’s claims to an expansive “nine-dash line” were invalid and that the
country's rights and obligations in the South China Sea were

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-rulingphilippines.html.
214 Id.
215 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), 1 (July 12, 2016)
(“... the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas and that protections for pre-existing rights to resources were considered, but not adopted in the
Convention.”).
216 Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention,
DIPLOMAT (May 24, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/u-s-ratification-of-thelaw-of-the-sea-convention/ (describing how UNCLOS remains one of forty-five U.S.
treaties still awaiting Senate ratification but still has an influence on U.S. conduct).
217 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 186, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397;
International
Courts
and
Tribunals,
U.N.
&
RULE
L.,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-law-courts-tribunals/international-courts-and-tribunals/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2021).
218 Perlez, supra note 213.
219 Id.
220 Fu Ying, Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea, FOREIGN
POL’Y (July 10, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/10/why-china-says-noto-the-arbitration-on-the-south-china-sea/ (“Beijing’s position is clear: no acceptance, no participation, no recognition, and no implementation.” China’s position
was that the matter before the tribunal implicated issues of sovereignty, which do not
fall under the auspices of the UNCLOS treaty.).
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comprehensively governed by UNCLOS.221 Additionally, the tribunal
ruled that neither the Spratly Islands nor the Scarborough Shoal are entitled to an EEZ.222 This means that the resources in the southern part of
the South China Sea and encompassed by China’s nine-dash-line, belong
to the coastal states: Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Vietnam. Despite this ruling, the PRC has continued to pressure those
coastal states for “joint development,” in effect ignoring the tribunal's
decision.223 Both Vietnam and the Philippines have been financially impacted by their inability to exploit natural gas resources in the face of
the PRC’s continued pressure.224 The U.S. has an opportunity where a
majority of affected East Asian states are opposed to and distrustful of
PRC ambitions. Indeed, the U.S. has continued so-called freedom of navigation exercises near the Spratly islands.225 This symbolic military assertiveness to bolster the legal framework of UNCLOS at sea and the Budapest Convention over cyberspace should be applied to space, which
lacks U.S.-sponsored rules governing militarization.
D. The Key Domain: Confronting the Chinese Government’s
Lawfare in Space
America’s military technical advantage over China is pronounced
in space. Due to its relative newness as an exploitable domain, space has
seen rapid changes in technology.226 The decades-long head start that
the U.S. has had over the PRC’s space ambitions provides an incentive
for China to use political and lawfare means to close the gap. As stated
earlier, the PPWT seeks to win political points by constraining the U.S.
221 Republic of the Phil. v. China, PCA Case Repository 2013-19 ¶¶ 261–62
(Perm. Ct. Arb. July 12, 2016).
222 Bill Hayton, Two Years On, South China Sea Ruling Remains a Battleground for
the Rules-Based Order, CHATHAM HOUSE (July 11, 2018), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/07/two-years-south-china-sea-ruling-remains-battleground-rulesbased-order.
223 Id.
224 Id.; see also Ted Regencia, Alarm raised over Chinese ship intrusion in Philippine
waters,
AL
JAZEERA
(Feb.
2,
2021),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/2/china-survey-ship-enters-philippinewaters-without-permission (documenting continued tension related to Chinese incursions into the Philippine’s EEZ).
225 Brad Lendon, US steps up challenges to Chinese-claimed islands in South China
Sea, CNN (Feb. 17, 2021, 2:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/17/asia/usnavy-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-intl-hnk/index.html.
226 Guglielmo S. Aglietti, Current Challenges and Opportunities for Space Technologies, FRONTIERS SPACE TECHNOLOGIES (June 16, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frspt.2020.00001/full.
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while China develops its own military counter-weapons to U.S. superiority. But the technological advancement that the U.S. enjoys in space
also means that the U.S. military is uniquely reliant on space. While
space revolutionized how the U.S. waged war against non-state actors
and less developed adversaries, it also presents the most attractive target for the PRC in a future conflict. A conflict without satellites would
change the way the military operates. “What happens is you go back to
World War II. You go back to industrial age warfare.”227 A space-neutralized conflict would serve as an equalizer in a future conflict between
the U.S. and the PRC. Therefore, the U.S. reliance on space has additional
risks even in limited conflicts.
The issue of space debris means that even if a limited conflict occurred in space, it would risk polluting space for the foreseeable future.
Any kinetic or destructive skirmish in orbit could have cascading effects.
The impact of a cascading chain reaction of collisions known as “The
Kessler Syndrome,” means that debris can potentially render entire
swaths of orbit off limits.228 While this would be disastrous for humanity, it would have an outsized impact on the U.S. in particular.229 The mutual aversion to exponential space debris is likely a reason that a binding
agreement could be reached, much in the same way the U.S.S.R. and U.S.
banned space based WMDs in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.230
The United States has a reputational advantage over China on the
issue of space stewardship. The 2007 Chinese ASAT test was widely
condemned and exposed China’s disregard for the impact of its unilateral pursuit of national security that ignores the interest of third-party
states.231 Despite these setbacks, China, with the enthusiastic
227 David Martin, The Battle Above: U.S. and China are locked in a high stakes contest over satellites that are critical to national security and everyday life, 60 MINUTES
(Apr. 26, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/rare-look-at-space-commandsatellite-defense-60 -minutes/ (quoting General John Hyten).
228 Micrometeoroids
and Orbital Debris, NASA (June 14, 2016),
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/wstf/site_tour/remote_hypervelocity_test_laboratory/micrometeoroid_and_orbital_debris.html.
229 Koplow, Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space, supra note 24, at 347 (quoting
“If a shooting war were to start in, or move to, space, the United States would have far
more to lose, and even if the U.S. ASAT capabilities were greater than those of its rivals, the United States would run out of targets to shoot at fairly quickly, long before
its potential adversaries had exhausted their ASAT magazines.”).
230 Daryl Kimball, The Outer Space Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Oct.
2020), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace (discussing the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. push for the Outer Space Treaty).
231 Anthony J. Mastalir, The US Response to China’s ASAT Test: An International
Security Space Alliance for the Future (Aug. 2009) (Drew Paper No. 8) (on file with
Air University).
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cooperation of Russia, has attempted to present itself as a defender of
peaceful space operations in opposition to the U.S. rush to exploit and
further militarize outer space.232 The U.S. has the opportunity to respond to this narrative in a way that strengthens its position as world
leader and in line with its own national-security interests. Proposing a
ban on debris-causing tests is directly in line with those interests.
1.

The Advantage of Proposing a Kinetic ASAT Test Ban

In the realm of international law and policy, words matter. Russian Federation and PRC claim that the U.S. is “weaponizing space”
and the introduction and reintroduction of the PPWT in 2008 and
2014 are made because they are part of a coherent and coordinated
strategy to maximize power relative to the U.S.233 Indeed, the U.S. positioning as a sole objector on U.N. General Assembly Resolutions regarding the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space illustrates how other
nations have defined the narrative on responsible use of space.234 Rather than focusing exclusively on technology to guarantee its national
security interests in space, the U.S. should affirmatively advance proposals for the rules regulating the weaponization of space. These proposals need not offer a comprehensive or ambitious solution to the
weaponization of space, but rather provide an American response to
the cynically expedited PRC and Russian Federation proposals embodied by the PPWT. Indeed, certain scholars have argued that a kinetic satellite test ban is feasible, and in-line with U.S. national security interests. 235 A prohibition on kinetic ASAT tests would confront

232 See Pavel Podvig & Hui Zhang, Chapter 2: Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons, AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCIENCES, https://www.amacad.org/publication/russian-andchinese-responses-us-military-plans-space/section/4 (expressing the shared concern over U.S. ambitions) (last visited Nov. 26, 2021).
233 Frank A. Rose, The U.S. Defense Space Strategy works on paper, but will it be
implemented?, BROOKINGS (July 6, 2020) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2020/07/06/the-u-s-defense-space-strategy-works-on-paper-but-willit-be-implemented/ (“Russia and China have been moderately successful in advancing their diplomatic agenda in this area with initiatives like the No First Place of
Weapons in Outer Space resolution at the UNGA, and the introduction of their draft
Prevention of Place of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty in the CD.”).
234 G.A. Res. 43/70, at 71 (Dec. 7, 1988).
235 Beard, supra note 29, at 417–18 (“[T]here should be a focus on [...] systems
employing kinetic energy which represent the greatest current threat of weaponsrelated debris generation in space[. This] is within the competence of states to clearly
define, regulate and verify under an appropriate international legal regime.”);
Thompson, supra note 33, at 158; see also Koplow, Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer
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a significant threat to the international community, underline U.S. political goals by illustrating responsible governorship of space, and advance U.S. national security vice a vis its rivals. More importantly, it
would place the U.S. at the forefront of a lawfare push to constrain
China’s ambitions to the extent they are inconsistent with the RBIO.
China cannot be constrained by force in the long run, rather, as one
strategist argues:
The overriding political objective should be to cause China’s elite
leadership to collectively conclude that it is in [China’s] best interests to
continue to operate within the existing US-led liberal international order rather than build a rival order, and that it is in the [Chinese Communist Party’s] best interests, if it wishes to remain in power at home,
not to attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model
beyond China’s shores.236

This strategic objective necessarily entails a lawfare strategy consistent with the U.S. conception of the rule of law.237 The current emphasis on military deterrence will be insufficient in the long run
against an opponent that is content to manipulate its population to
share its nationalist goals and run out the clock as its relative economic power and influence expands.238
2.

The Kinetic ASAT Test Ban Through the Lens of Game Theory

The prisoner’s dilemma is frequently cited in international relations where each state has an incentive to selfishly pursue their own
interest but in doing so, it forfeits the benefits of cooperation.239 Critically, the dilemma is not just between two players but is conducted
in the presence of allies, adversaries, and the entire international community. The U.S. may be faced with a dilemma between itself and
Space, supra note 24, at 363–65 (proposing a “limited test ban,” to interdict the most
dangerous debris-creating developmental tests of new space weapons).
236 THE LONGER TELEGRAM, supra note 22, at 9.
237 Id. at 10.
238 How nationalism is shaping China’s young, ECONOMIST (Jan. 23, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2021/01/21/how-nationalism-isshaping-chinas-young (“Soon after Mr Xi’s rise to power, officials were summoned to
secret briefings about a party circular called “Document Number Nine”. The directive
banned schools from teaching seven Western concepts, such as constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society and a free press. This had a big impact on universities as centres of student activism and political debate.”).
239 See Prisoner’s Dilemma Applied to International Treaty Interpretation, WAGING
PEACE TODAY (Aug. 10, 2012, 1:00 PM), https://wagingpeacetoday.blogspot.com/2012/08/prisoners-dilemma-applied-to_10.html.
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China while simultaneously facing other dilemmas, current and future, with other actors on the world stage. Its decisions in resolving
the current prisoner’s dilemma will have an impact on its future dealings with friends and adversaries.
In the arena of space weapons, the U.S. has perceived pursuing
technological and military advantage as having a greater national security benefit than seeking arms control. China shares the same calculus but is aware of the U.S. aversion to any form of arms control
treaty. The PPWT is not necessarily reflective of the Chinese Communist Party’s interest in cooperative arms control, but rather that it
sees an opportunity to damage America’s international standing while
continually presenting the PPWT as a good faith and responsible alternative to the unrestrained weaponization of space.240 This is consistent with a strategy to use alternative means to seek relative power
and influence vis-a-vis the U.S. The U.S. maintains a technical and military advantage in space and retains a great deal of goodwill and political clout.241 But it has suffered unnecessary harm from the legal
and political battle the PRC and the Russian Federation waged concerning arms control in space.
In the matrix of a prisoner’s dilemma, there is an advantage to
proposing cooperation whether or not cooperation is ever achieved.
Likewise, there is a harm in appearing to reject an offer of cooperation
even if that offer is made in bad faith. The U.S. has the opportunity to
propose limited arms control that, if accepted, will yield the benefit of
focusing the arms control race away from destructive debris-causing
uses. If not accepted, it will achieve a moral and legal victory in the
international community.
IV. CONCLUSION
A space lawfare strategy acknowledges the realities of an emerging global powershift while not provoking a Chinese security dilemma
with escalating effects.242 It leverages the American advantage in
240 See generally Raphael J. Piliero, Seeking Common Ground: US-China Arms Control in Outer Space, U.S.-CHINA PERCEPTION MONITOR (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://uscnpm.org/2020/09/15/seeking-common-ground-us-china-arms-control/
(describing how U.S. objectives in space arms control and their rejection of PPWT undermine their international reliability and standing).
241 See Stephen M. McCall, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IFI0337, CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED
STATES IN SPACE (2020).
242 Cf. Lyle J. Goldstein, The Indo-Pacific Strategy Is a Recipe for Disaster, LAWFARE
(Feb. 18, 2021, 8:56 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/indo-pacific-strategy-
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shared values in East Asia and across the world. Viewing developing
space security law through a lawfare lens requires neither the faith of
a grand arms control bargain nor the cynical realism of a weapons
buildup. If narrowly tailored, it can restrict the riskiest behaviors in
space, starting with orbital debris, while allowing U.S. advancements
in new security technology. If successful, it will contribute to international space security while advancing American standing and influence across domains. If unsuccessful, it will at least allow the U.S. to
present itself as the global leader it already is, the steward of rulesbased order that provides the world with its best chance at continued
peace, security, and prosperity.

recipe-disaster (critiquing a 2018 declassified U.S. strategy that risked creating a security dilemma with China, escalating tensions).
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